



Parliamentary Opposition and Legislative Proposals: A Study of Institutional Constraints on The Role of The Moroccan Opposition

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Abstract

Background: In line with developments in more progressive constitutional democracies, Morocco's 2011 Constitution specifically expands the powers of the House of Representatives. It also strengthens the rights of the opposition by granting broad legal authority and privileges that go beyond the general boundaries of representative democracy based on proportional representation.

Objective: This framework grants the opposition constitutional power, positions it within both majority and minority blocs, and provides significant participation in parliamentary decision-making.

Methods: This study employed normative legal research with a comparative constitutional approach. Data were collected through document and legal content analysis of constitutional, legislative, and institutional sources, supported by academic literature. Qualitative and comparative analyses were conducted to evaluate Morocco's constitutional framework, parliamentary opposition practices, and comparative parliamentary rights.

Results: As emphasized in the Constitution, the opposition plays an important role in the legislative process, contributing primarily to the introduction of bills in the bicameral legislature. At least one day per month is devoted to reviewing bills, with opposition participation included. One of the important roles of the opposition in the House of Representatives is chairing the Committee on Justice, Legislation, and Human Rights, as well as other standing committees that are not subject to the internal rules of Parliament. This is based on the provisions of Article 10, paragraph 2, and Article 69, paragraph 3 of the Constitution.

Conclusion: Despite the importance of these provisions, some scholars argue that they do not always guarantee an effective opposition within the legislative process.

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INTRODUCTION

The study of political science and constitutional law considers the existence of parliamentary opposition parties a key indicator of democratic practice and recognizes their traditional legislative role in a political system rooted in liberal philosophy and the separation of powers. Therefore, it is important to examine the limits of the legislative functions carried out by these opposition parties and their relationship with the executive branch and the majority party in parliament. Comparative studies have consistently shown that the influence of opposition parties in parliament is an important indicator of the quality of democracy (Dahl, 2026; Dahl,

2008).

In established parliamentary democracies such as Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, the opposition has the institutional right to set legislative agendas, propose bills, and obtain formal responses or rejections from the government (Bonin et al., 2025; van Well, 2025). However, in transitional constitutional regimes, especially in the Arab world, the formal rights of opposition parties differ significantly from their actual implementation, reflecting structural constraints inherent in constitutional and parliamentary frameworks. Morocco's 2011 Constitution was a pioneering attempt to expand the powers of parliament and formally recognize the rights of dissent. The Constitution, adopted after the Arab Spring protests, introduced Articles 10, 69, 77, 82, and 83, which aim to strengthen the opposition's legislative role in the lower house. However, empirical evidence from the tenth parliamentary term (2016–2021) shows a significant gap between constitutional promises and legislative reality, effectively limiting opposition efforts due to government dominance over the parliamentary agenda.

Previous studies have addressed various aspects of this issue. Medromi (2026) reviewed the constitutional protection of the opposition in the Moroccan parliament, and ARSLAN (2025) analyzed the formal authority of the opposition under the 2011 Constitution. Kamel (2026) reviewed constitutional protections for the rights of dissent, and Omer (2025) documented the limitations of Morocco's parliamentary financial legislation. At the international level, the Venice Commission (2010) established criteria for assessing the democratic maturity of parliamentary systems based on the rights of opposition parties. Stone (2014) provided a comparative framework for parliamentary opposition in democratic systems (Stone, 2026). Despite these contributions, gaps remain in the empirical evaluation of legislative performance during the tenth parliamentary term and in the systematic comparison of institutional constraints in Morocco with those in other parliamentary systems.

The novelty of this study lies in the systematic and empirical evaluation of legislative performance during the tenth parliamentary term (2016–2021) of the Moroccan parliamentary opposition, based on a comparative institutional analysis of the parliaments of Sweden, Denmark, and the United States. This dual approach allows for a critical assessment of whether the constitutional amendments introduced in 2011 granted significant powers to the parliamentary opposition. The study has three main objectives: (1) to analyze the constitutional framework outlining the rights of opposition parties in Morocco's 2011 Constitution; (2) to evaluate the opposition's legislative achievements during the tenth parliamentary term; and (3) to identify institutional reforms needed to strengthen the legislative role of the opposition. These findings contribute to broader research on constitutional law, parliamentary systems, and the institutional design of democratic governance during transitional periods. To explore this topic, the analysis is divided into two parts: first, the legislative role of parliamentary minorities in the constitutional framework of 2011; and second, the institutional constraints on the legislative role of parliamentary minorities.

METHOD

This research combined normative legal design with a comparative constitutional approach (Marzuki, 2017; Rosidi et al., 2026). The study systematically examined the legislative role of the opposition in Morocco using legislative, conceptual, historical, and comparative approaches. The main legal sources were: (1) the 2011 Constitution of Morocco; (2) Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives (2017); (3) official reports of the Tenth National Parliament (2016–2021); (4) reports of the Venice Commission on the rights of parliamentary opposition; and (5) Organic Law 13-065 establishing the relationship between the Government and Parliament.

Secondary sources included peer-reviewed academic papers, books, and institutional reports from organizations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Data were collected through systematic document analysis and legal content analysis. The analytical methods applied included: (a) qualitative analysis for the substantive evaluation and implementation of constitutional provisions; (b) comparative analysis of the rights of the Moroccan opposition and parliamentary rights in Sweden, Denmark, and the United States; and (c) analysis of statistical data from the Tenth Legislature, including measurements of opposition

participation and identification of cross-sectoral differences. This methodological framework allowed for a comprehensive assessment of both the formal constitutional framework and the practical performance of the opposition during the legislative term.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The legislative role of parliamentary minorities: the constitutional experience of 2011

The constitutional legislature aims to go beyond the numerical limits of proportional representation, grant constitutional powers to parliamentary minorities, and allow them to participate in the submission of legislative proposals (Bönisch, 2025). Article 10 of the 2011 Constitution recognizes the right of the opposition to participate effectively in the legislative process, by including proposed legislation in the agenda of two sessions. In addition, the constitution guarantees the participation of the opposition in parliamentary committees by appointing the opposition party as the chairman of the legislative committee (Article 69). This system emphasizes that the legislature is not the exclusive prerogative of the government, but rather a shared responsibility between the various parties involved, including the government and the opposition.

Given comparative experience, the participation of the parliamentary opposition in legislation is an important element of the democratic nature of legislation. The government's legislative approach is sometimes unbalanced, preferring a broader social perspective to a technical one. To address this, several institutional mechanisms have been established to promote opposition legislative initiatives and to establish control over administrative procedures. In some constitutional frameworks, a parliamentary minority has the right to request that legislation be adjourned for greater scrutiny and scrutiny. This mechanism is critical, giving opponents the opportunity to challenge the passage of a quick majority bill and thoroughly review controversial bills. This issue will be discussed in detail in the next section.

The Role of the Opposition in the Legislative Process: Overcoming the Absence of Representative Democracy

The constitutional legislature reduced the limits of proportional representation, and provided constitutional authority to allow minorities to participate effectively in legislative progress, which relied solely on numerical distribution (El Bazzim, 2024).

It also frees parliamentary minorities from the constraints of representative democracy, which usually only provides the ability and guarantees to influence parliamentary decision-making (Beka, 2022).

What is a parliamentary minority legislative proposal?

Some scholars define legislative initiative as "the act of establishing the initial basis of a law and defining its content and subject." Delivering clear and coherent bills and technical proposals requires effort and expertise.

The British experience has long been used as a model for building a history of parliamentary customs, traditions, and practices, where power is concentrated in the prime minister, defends the rights of the opposition, wins majority support in parliament, and adheres to the rules of political change under the control of the electoral body. With regard to the Moroccan political and constitutional system, the process of liberalization of democracy is gradually developing. However, challenges remain in the transition to democracy. Thus, after a difficult experience, the Moroccan parliament strengthened constitutional life, provided a framework for struggle among the political elite, and provided a broad platform for political expression and expression, but its relationship with the government was complex at all levels.

Its components are unbalanced and include the repetition of guidelines related to royal laws and regulations, the concept of parliamentary majority, lack of experience in parliamentary affairs, inadequate political culture among parliamentarians, and government control over the legislative process and parliamentary agenda. All of these factors contribute to varying degrees in shaping the image of the parliamentary opposition, its level of performance, and the boundaries of its role and function within the parliamentary institution.

The principles of democracy require the participation of opposition parties in the legislature, give them legislative initiative in legislative proposals and deliberations in special

committees and parliamentary sessions, and give them the right to propose, debate, and vote on amendments. Article 10 of the 2011 Constitution gives the opposition the right to participate effectively in the legislative process, and specifically puts the draft on the agenda of both houses. The right to propose refers to legislation that lays the foundation and determines its content, and grants privileges and possibilities to a parliamentary minority to propose bills for debate.

Article 60, paragraph 2 also states that "the opposition is an important part of the local council and participates in legislative duties and supervision," emphasizing that the legislative sphere does not only belong to the government but also to various institutions such as "the government and the opposition."

In addition to these requirements, article 82 of the Constitution states that at least one day per month can be reviewed, including bills submitted by opposition parties. According to researcher Jalal al-Said, the clause aims to end the isolation of legislative opposition activities within parliament and urge the government to review proposed laws and amendments in both chambers.

According to one researcher, the provisions of article 82 seem to reinforce and operate what is usually stated in article 10. This issue concerns "effective participation in the legislative process, in particular ensuring that the opposition's participation in legislation is not limited to the registration of agenda bills through the registration of proposed laws in both houses."

The Constitutional Legislature shall make every effort to appoint the Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the opposition party to participate in the activities of parliamentary committees (Article 69) and to appoint important positions in the legislative sphere. Article 70 of the House of Commons Rules of Procedure states that Congress must appoint at least two opposition committee chairmen, one of whom must be a legislative committee. In addition, when the opposition submitted its candidacy, it prioritized oversight of public finances, protected opposition activities from majority control and achieved a balanced outcome. Although it is recognized that government projects and parliamentary majority control have kept minorities out of the legislative process, they ensure the exercise of their power and undermine the performance of parliamentary minorities as legal protection, limiting their ability to adopt proposed laws and placing them on the parliamentary agenda. However, the role of the Committee Chair is neutral and requires coordination between the Committee and the Government.

The amendment authority is also the main authority of opposition lawmakers to enrich discussions and convey opinions and opinions on various political and financial issues prepared by the government and proposed in standing committees and plenary sessions. Professor Jean-Pierre Campay explained that the power of change is at the heart of legislative proposals, and that the main means by which governments and parliaments communicate are the primary means by which governments and parliaments communicate. Therefore, the power of change is an important tool in the possession of the opposition, and Article 83, paragraph 1 of the Constitution states: "Members of Congress and members of the government have the right to change."

This system helps opposition lawmakers cover up a lack of initiative through legislation.

The involvement of opposition parties in the legislative process in Congress is likely to positively influence legislative decisions and promote democracy in the legislative process. The government's view of the law can be misunderstood by focusing too much on the technical aspects at the expense of social access. Therefore, considering the views of the opposition the parliament contributes significantly to improving decision-making during the legislative process.

While the government has the upper hand in drafting most of the bills, the parliamentary opposition is positioning itself as an active contender, drawing public attention to the government's contradictions and unintended consequences of the proposed bill, and playing an indirect role. This could lead to negative media coverage of the government, which could influence future elections and encourage the government to review the proposal more thoroughly. The opposition's proposal is to reduce the intensity of the criticism before the bill is formally introduced.

Constitutional Framework and Comparative Institutional Mechanisms for the Rights of the Opposition

The Role of Institutional Mechanisms in Strengthening Opposition Legislation: A Relative Perspective

To limit executive dominance over the legislature, some constitutions give minorities the right to propose delays in ratifying bills, allowing for greater oversight and oversight (El Islam, 2025). For example, in Sweden, if at least 10 out of 349 people request it, the human rights constitution can be delayed for one year. Only a majority of 5 in 6 people (83%) can refuse to be late. In fact, a party or coalition with more than one-sixth of the seats can activate this suspension mechanism. Although the opposition parties may not ultimately block the passage of this law, the influence of the decisive majority, this power provides a valuable opportunity to facilitate debate in Congress and in the media. This process can put political pressure on the government and lead to proposed legal amendments.

This mechanism encourages governments to address differences of opinion and potential concerns first, and to reach an agreement before accelerating the adoption of laws and provoking opposition resistance. While Sweden's mechanism is limited to a human rights constitution, Denmark takes a broader and less restrictive approach. Under the Danish system, a minority of five lawmakers can delay the introduction of the bill for 12 days, with exceptions for the Funds Act, the Naturalization Act, and the Emergencies Act. This deceleration force is relatively weak but plays an important role.

This mechanism prevents rapid legislative adoption and prevents the opposition from avoiding substantive review of controversial bills that might undergo public scrutiny and a full Congress without institutional protections. According to the study, the more involved the opposition is in negotiating the content of the law, the more it moves away from criticizing government policies and proposing alternatives to active participation in government. This is in stark contrast to the classic Westminster concept of opposition. The opposition primarily views alternative executive power competing for power with the ruling party, believing that there is no effective way to prevent or limit the control of the legislative majority.

In the same vein, the Venice Commission considered proposals for legislative opposition, representation, participation, the right to speak and vote, and protection from abuse as criteria for assessing the maturity of democracy. While it is true that the principle of majority government reflects the will of most of the people and serves as the official and official standard of basic "democracy", the legislative role of the opposition must be activated, that is, it must be allowed to offer political alternatives to voters. Improve the decision-making process in the Council, discuss, discuss considerations, objections, and review laws related to the general budget. In this case, measuring the extent to which the opposition can perform these functions in the parliamentary system is an indicator of democratic maturity. But if nothing is achieved, it is a sign of a flawed democracy.

The Venice Commission's findings overlap with the recommendations of a parliamentary symposium on majority-minority relations in African parliaments, which require that all members, whether majority or minority, have the same right to propose bills and amendments. Based on the above, we can highlight the experience of the US Congress. Congress can introduce more than 10,000 bill proposals in each session. This figure is because members of both houses support the theory of equality in legislation, regardless of whether they are in the majority or the opposition. However, the U.S. Constitution adopts the principle of separation of powers, giving Congress full legislative powers, but not explicitly giving Congress the power to propose legislation. However, it was agreed that the principle of separation of powers provided a constitutional basis for legislators to propose legislation

The National Law on the Collection and Increase of Revenue is subject to the jurisdiction of the members of the House of Representatives. The Senate has the right to propose amendments that are financial in nature, meaning that the U.S. Constitution gives constitutional priority to the House of Representatives at the expense of the Senate's interests. The Senate has the power to propose financial-related bills, and at the same time, both houses have the same right to propose non-financial bills.

The constitutional right to propose bills is a matter for the entire legislature, but the

initiative in the bill is in the hands of the executive branch. From a constitutional perspective, he cannot propose such laws, but they often act as intermediaries in the government and propose proposals. Proposals by lawmakers are often based on the will of government bodies, political parties, pressure groups, and even the public in their constituencies and other areas. This is because only senators and representatives can propose bills and the U.S. Constitution does not specify exactly what qualifies for a proposal.

There are institutional constraints on the legislative role of parliamentary minorities

Despite the significant increase in parliamentary legislative minority participation introduced in the 2011 constitution, control over legislative government proposals is still in effect. The government retains the power of popular and opposition parties to reject proposals if they lead to a reduction in government revenues, and the introduction of new public taxes, especially existing tax increases in the fiscal legislative sector.

In addition, Article 77 of the Constitution gives the government an important role in opposing amendments proposed by members of Congress and prohibits discussion of amendments that are not reviewed by competent parliamentary committees. This power, along with managing the government's parliamentary agenda, reinforces the importance of government in the legislative process.

So, in this section, we first look at the extent to which the government is superior to the parliamentary agenda. Furthermore, it analyzes the constraints and sectoral imbalances resulting from the absence of an integrated strategy that guides legislative activities in the tenth session of the opposition parliament.

Government control and the exclusion of parliamentary minorities

Government control of legislative policies and the exclusion of parliamentary minorities

In addition, as the role of minorities in the financial sector has declined, many researchers note that the government still has an advantage over legislative policies (Lupo, 2026; Poirier, 2026). This institution has the constitutional authority to respect the principle of financial legitimacy. Based on articles 77 and 79 of the Constitution, the government exercises supervisory authority over various fiscal policy measures. This allowed Congress to consolidate the dominance of the executive branch and become a secondary legislator.

In addition, the government reserves the right to veto any parliamentary proposal or amendment in the financial sector if approval leads to cuts in public funds for fiscal legislation, the creation of new public spending, or an increase in existing spending. To curb the government's suppression of the parliamentary bill, the constitutional legislature tried to explain the reason for the rejection based on article 77 of the 2011 Constitution. In addition, Organic Law 065.13, which regulates the organization and administration of public works and the legal status of its members, requires the government to hold at least one bill review meeting of members of the majority and minority parties to clarify their positions.

In addition to Article 77, the government plays an important role in rejecting amendments deemed inappropriate, but Article 83 of the constitution gives the government the power to refuse to discuss amendments that are not before the relevant parliamentary committees.

The government has the power to reject parliamentary proposals and amendments in the financial sector, and is ready to respond immediately if such approval leads to a reduction in public funding for fiscal legislation, the introduction of new government spending, or an increase in existing spending. To reduce the government's harsh response to parliamentary legislation, article 77 of the 2011 Constitution requires the government to explain the reasons for its refusal. In addition, Organic Law 065.13, which governs the organization, administration, and membership status of public utilities, requires the government to hold at least one meeting to review bills submitted by majority and minority members and to clearly state their positions.

In addition to the powers granted under Article 77 of the Constitution, Article 83 of the Constitution allows the government to reconsider the discussion of amendments that have not yet been submitted to the relevant parliamentary committees.

In addition, at the committee level, the government enjoys privileges. This is because the

government can adopt a majority of the bill, change the standing committee and reject the bill or the opposite amendment. In addition, the government rejected amendments that refused to invest in constitutional methods that restricted legislative freedom and considered them to undermine legal coherence. Some may argue that a minority in Congress has the right to propose or amend such legislation, but the final decision is in the hands of the majority, and that right is being eroded, especially with the government's monopoly on fiscal legislation. It manifests itself as a logic of justification based on the influence of the Moroccan parliament, given the legacy of the French constitutional system of the Fifth Republic.

The obstacles to the opposition's role go beyond legal and substantive obstacles to political constraints caused by the control of the pro-government parliamentary majority party.

This is because the principle of factional proportional representation was introduced when members of the Standing Committee were appointed, which marginalized the role of factions. Without government approval, it is impossible to pass a bill or amendment; The government can restore various constitutional mechanisms and powers (A. Omer & Garwood-Gowers, 2025; Pratiwi et al., 2026), and can use coercion, pressure, and negotiate informally through informal means. This situation gives them power and can undermine minority legislative policies.

Parliamentary minorities can sometimes bring certain issues to the attention of the government and propose bills in certain areas, but these proposals often only change some or more legislative provisions. Moreover, the quantitative and qualitative weaknesses of this proposal are clear and limited to key areas.

The opposition's limited role goes beyond legal and substantive barriers to political constraints caused by the control of a parliamentary majority that supports the government. This is because the party's role in appointing permanent committee members through proportional representation has been neglected. It is impossible to pass a bill or amendment without government approval, and this can be traced back to the various constitutional mechanisms and powers that governments have, or often by informal means such as coercion, pressure, and negotiation. This allows them to gain power and divide legislative proposals among minority parliamentary factions.

Parliamentary minorities sometimes draw attention to specific government issues and successfully introduce bills in certain areas, but these proposals are usually limited to minor changes in one or more legislative budgets. In addition, the proposals are weak in quantity and quality, and are limited to core areas.

Opposition: sectoral differences and lack of coherent strategies

Limitations of opposition legislative activities: sectoral differences and lack of coherent strategies

In the results of the 10th National Assembly, 335 bills were approved, and the opposition put forward 105 proposals, representing about 34.31%. This low percentage highlights the dominance of the executive branch over legislative action.

The proposal put forward by the opposition in the 10th Congress reveals a sectoral imbalance. The opposition put forward 25 proposals mainly related to law, justice and human rights, and 22 proposals on domestic and public policy, housing and urbanism. However, important areas of legislation and regulation, such as economics, finance, social issues, and industrialization, are largely ignored. This highlights the opposition's absence of a clear legislative strategy, exacerbated by a lack of coordination and fragmented efforts. In addition, they tend to seek majority consensus by supporting government bills or putting forward joint proposals with a total of 26 members during their term. This action was motivated by clear political motives and interests.

As parties become accustomed to the government and are reluctant to join the opposition, the situation often becomes more complicated, sometimes in the form of political expulsion after a last-minute decision or expulsion from the ruling coalition. This raises questions about the true role of the parliamentary opposition in the Moroccan political system. The opposite forces seem to arise out of necessity, not by choice.

Minority party deputies have shown a weak attitude towards legislative work, and over the past ten terms, the opposition has introduced 150 fewer bills than they have proposed.

On the other hand, the ten terms have demonstrated a sustained approach to governance and behavior, effectively transforming Congress into a purely formal institution. It should be noted that the opposition has not shown any opposition in voting activities related to the policies of the legislative government. At times, fierce debates escalated into criticism of the government, but the vote ended unanimously. However, what many people overlook is that this practice does not benefit parliamentary institutions; rather, it reinforces one of the reasons that hinder and paralyze the functions of legislation and supervision. Since parliament is made up of majority and minority parties, parliament cannot function properly without one party. Cooperation, partnerships, and several methods between majority and minority parliaments are essential to improve the performance of parliamentary bodies and the execution of mandated tasks.

Tabel 1. Voting results in the bill

Billing	Songs	Percentage
Approved unanimously	251	79 percent
Majority in favor	66	21%
Quantity	317	100 percent

Source: Research data

Previously, the government dominated legislative proposals and mechanisms, but based on these facts, the government exercises absolute control over legislative production and quality. This can be explained as the end of parliamentary rationality, but the importance of subjective factors cannot be ruled out. This is because some believe that the opposition's poor performance and poor performance are the responsibility of the lawmakers themselves. This view is reflected in the review of legislative proposals in parliament, the activities of minority committees, and participation in plenary sessions, and Article 78 of the 2011 Constitution clearly affirms the right of government leaders and parliamentarians to propose bills

However, during the tenth legislative period, all parliamentary groups and blocs (majority and opposition) in both houses can table 314 bills and the government puts forward 350 bills showing an imbalance between the two institutions.

One of the criticisms of the 10th and 11th opposition parties is that many of their proposals are amendments, with some aimed at complementing, changing, or repealing existing legislative provisions to align with current government policies. For example, during the tenth term, the opposition put forward 66 proposals to amend, complement, or repeal previous legislative provisions, accounting for 63.36% of the total approvals, and 30 legislative proposals accounting for 28.8%.

Many of these changes do not affect the content or specificity of the government's drafting of laws. This is also supported by a report on legislative initiatives put forward by the parliamentary bloc (majority and opposition) in the third year of the eleventh legislative session, in which more than 83 proposals aimed at amending or strengthening the words of the law were submitted. Do not exceed 10 proposals related to the enactment of new laws.

The absence of opposition proposals reflects the absence of an independent law that clarifies legislative awareness and the views of parliamentarians on legislative policies, based on the needs of citizens and the economic, social and cultural conditions of the Moroccan people. They dominate sectarianism and represent the interests of certain social groups. Or in cases related to the personal interests of certain members or elites. According to the survey results, only 10% of respondents expressed confidence that legislators spend most of their time on civic issues and address political, economic, and social needs, while 34% felt that the interests of legislators are often focused on the personal interests of a few elites or groups, ignoring the public interest.

Table 2. Bills submitted by the House of Representatives (Parliamentary Group) during the tenth legislative period

Parliamentary Group	Other Bills Pending During the Ninth Session	Draft laws submitted during the tenth session	The bill was finally approved	The bill was adopted referred to the rest of the Senate	Repealed Laws	Other bills to consider after the due date Legislative Period 10
Definition and Development (Majority Opinion)		61	06		03	52
Constituent Assembly (Majority Opinion)		09	01	01		07
Working groups (multiple groups)		19				19
Socialist Party (Majority Party)		25	02	01		22
Independent Organization for Unity and Neutrality (Opposition Party)		45	01	02		42
Originality & Modernity Collection (Resistance)		47	02		03	42
Progressive and socialist (opposition) organizations		23				23
Joint Proposal		26	06		03	17
This is a bill submitted by the House of Representatives	06	07	02			11
Quantity	06	269	191	04	09	242

Source: Research data

CONCLUSION

The opposition's proposals in parliament are weak and almost non-existent, but the constitutional legislature establishes a formula to emphasize the role of the opposition. The executive branch often expands its influence and authority through excessive interference in the legislative sphere, and tends to monopolize government leadership in financial matters. It supports the influence of rationalism on the Moroccan parliament and provides a positive formula about the role of the opposition in the legislature while reviving the legacy of the Fifth Republic in 1958.

The results of the tenth round of legislative elections clearly show that the government is showing an effective and focused presence at every stage of the legislative process, with a clear advantage in legislative initiatives. This is due not only to constitutional and legal-technical problems, but also to material and technical capabilities, a lack of initiative in parliamentary work, and a willingness to follow the government rather than deny established facts or reject policy. The

government's ability to effectively promote legislative initiatives depends on the culture of legislators.

Claims of legal and substantive restraint are somewhat acceptable, but it is unacceptable for legislators to abandon their role in influencing and guiding the legislative process, leading to dysfunction in the legislature that supports the government. The executive branch is an ordinary legislative body with a strong and diverse constitutional mechanism. Parliament, on the other hand, is a special legislative body. In addition to stricter regulation of minority legislative proposals, it has been forced to mobilize various oversight mechanisms and measures to pressure the government, including strengthening political accountability through the filing of oversight petitions.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Hicham Nassar is the sole author of this article and is fully responsible for the entire research process, including the conceptualization of the study, literature review, data analysis, interpretation of findings, and manuscript preparation. The author read and approved the final version of the manuscript.

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