



Weaknesses and Future Ideas of Bawaslu as an Election Conflict Resolution Institution in Indonesia

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Abstract

Background: *Bawaslu*, as an electoral conflict resolution institution in Indonesia, faces persistent challenges, including the ineffectiveness of *Gakkumdu*, inconsistent normative interpretations, and the prevalence of money politics.

Objective: This research aims to identify the weaknesses of *Bawaslu* as an institution for resolving electoral disputes, particularly during the 2024 election, and to formulate institutional strengthening strategies for *Bawaslu* within Indonesia's electoral legal system.

Methods: This study employs normative doctrinal legal research using statutory, conceptual, and analytical approaches, supported by primary and secondary legal materials. Data analysis is conducted through qualitative legal interpretation by systematically examining regulatory provisions to identify normative gaps and institutional weaknesses.

Results: Three systemic weaknesses were identified: (1) formalistic procedural requirements that hinder the prosecution of money politics violations; (2) institutional design weaknesses within *Gakkumdu* that contribute to inter-agency deadlocks; and (3) a permissive legal culture that undermines the neutrality of election organizers.

Conclusion: Strengthening *Bawaslu* requires the harmonization of electoral regulations, reconstruction of *Gakkumdu's* institutional design, reinforcement of *Bawaslu's* binding enforcement authority, and cultivation of an ethical legal culture among election organizers based on substantive justice.

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INTRODUCTION

The institutional history of election supervision in Indonesia shows that Bawaslu was established in response to the need to address the crisis of public trust in the electoral process. In its early development, election supervision was not established as an independent institution but was known as the Election Supervisory Committee (*Panitia Pengawas Pelaksanaan Pemilu or Panwaslak Pemilu*). The establishment of the Election Supervisory Committee in 1982 cannot be separated from criticism of previous elections, particularly following allegations of manipulation and demands from election participants and civil society to improve electoral quality (Beka, 2025; Gloria, 2020).

During the reform period, the institutional design of election administration in Indonesia underwent fundamental changes. The General Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU*) was established as an independent election management body, while the election supervisory institution underwent a change in nomenclature from Panwaslak Pemilu to the Election Supervisory Committee (*Panitia Pengawas Pemilu or Panwaslu*). Through Law Number 12 of 2003, election supervision was separated from the KPU structure and established as an ad hoc institution. Further institutional strengthening occurred through Law Number 22 of 2007 concerning Election Organizers, which established the Election Supervisory Agency (*Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum*

or Bawaslu) as a permanent institution.

Bawaslu holds an important position in ensuring honest, fair, and transparent elections. This role includes supervising the stages of voter registration, registration of election participants and candidates, campaigning, voting, vote counting, and the determination of election results. In addition, Bawaslu is also responsible for handling various electoral issues, including money politics, identity politics, the dissemination of false information, administrative violations, electoral process disputes, election crimes, and violations of the election organizers' code of ethics. Therefore, Bawaslu is not only positioned as a supervisory institution but also as an essential component of the electoral conflict resolution system.

Despite having strategic authority, Bawaslu remains inseparable from various challenges in the practice of election law enforcement. These challenges include the effectiveness of the Integrated Law Enforcement Center (*Sentra Penegakan Hukum Terpadu* or Gakkumdu), differences in the interpretation of electoral norms, recurring practices of money politics, weak implementation of recommendations and decisions, and procedures that are often perceived as overly formalistic. This condition demonstrates that the Bawaslu institution requires examination not only from the perspective of its normative authority but also from the perspective of how the legal system operates in practice.

This article uses Lawrence M. Friedman's (2013) legal system theory as an analytical framework (Fundamental & Razak, 2023). According to this theory, the functioning of law is determined by three main components: legal substance, legal structure, and legal culture. Legal substance refers to applicable norms and regulations; legal structure concerns institutions and legal apparatus responsible for implementing the law; while legal culture relates to the attitudes, values, and behaviors of society and legal officials toward the law. These three components are relevant for examining the weaknesses and formulating future ideas for Bawaslu as an institution for resolving electoral conflicts in Indonesia (Zero, 2025).

Several previous studies have examined the strengthening of Bawaslu in dispute resolution and election law enforcement. Aermadepa emphasized that the future challenge of dispute resolution by Bawaslu lies in its ability to provide substantive justice rather than merely fulfilling procedural requirements. Junaidi argued that Bawaslu should not only function as a complementary institution but should also be positioned as one of the main pillars in resolving electoral legal issues (M. Junaidi, 2020; V. Junaidi & Maulana, 2020; Saktiko & Delmiati, 2026). Meanwhile, Madjid proposed reformulating Gakkumdu into an independent institution that not only conducts enforcement actions but also plays a preventive role in reducing election crimes (Aermadepa, 2019; Awaluddin, 2026).

Unlike previous studies, this article places Bawaslu within a more comprehensive framework of electoral conflict resolution through a legal system approach. While previous research has primarily emphasized the effectiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms or the reformulation of Gakkumdu, this article critically examines the weaknesses of legal substance, legal structure, and legal culture that influence Bawaslu's performance. The novelty of this research lies in the idea of strengthening Bawaslu as an integrated institution for resolving electoral conflicts, including a critical review of the existence and role of Gakkumdu in handling election crimes.

Based on this background, the research questions addressed in this article are: what are the weaknesses of Bawaslu as an institution for resolving electoral conflicts in Indonesia, and what future ideas can strengthen Bawaslu in enforcing election law based on substantive justice? The purpose of this research is to identify the weaknesses of Bawaslu and formulate institutional strengthening strategies within Indonesia's electoral legal system.

METHOD

This research was a normative or doctrinal legal study. Normative legal research was understood as research that examined law through literature materials or secondary data. This research also adopted the constructivism paradigm to interpret law as a reality constructed through social, institutional, and law enforcement practices (Muhaimin, 2020; Rosidi et al., 2026).

The approaches used in this research were the legislative approach, conceptual approach, and analytical approach. The legislative approach was employed to examine the provisions contained in Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, Bawaslu Regulations, KPU Regulations, and other relevant regulations. (Law No. 7, 2017) The conceptual approach was used to understand the concepts of electoral conflict resolution, substantive justice, and legal system theory (Nomor, 7 C.E.).

The analytical approach was applied to assess the relationship between electoral law enforcement norms, institutional structures, and implementation practices.

The types of legal materials examined in this research included primary legal materials, secondary legal materials, and tertiary legal materials. Primary legal materials consisted of laws and regulations related to elections, while secondary legal materials included books, journal articles, research findings, and relevant scientific publications. Tertiary legal materials were used to clarify terms and concepts supporting the discussion. The legal material collection technique was conducted through literature studies, and the collected materials were analyzed using a descriptive qualitative method by systematically and consistently describing legal phenomena ([Syamsarina et al., 2022](#)).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Weaknesses of Law Enforcement by Bawaslu

Democracy requires an electoral mechanism that is not only procedural but also capable of guaranteeing the sovereignty of the people in substantive terms. In the Indonesian context, elections serve as the primary instrument for translating the principle of popular sovereignty as affirmed in the Constitution. However, the implementation of elections cannot be assessed merely based on the existence of complete electoral stages; elections must also be evaluated based on the ability of legal frameworks and supervisory institutions to ensure that each stage is conducted honestly and fairly. This issue is crucial because formal democracy may lose its substantive meaning if electoral violations are not addressed effectively.

Law enforcement is fundamentally a process through which legal norms operate in practice as guidelines for behavior within society and the state. In the context of elections, law enforcement is not solely intended to punish offenders but also to safeguard the integrity of electoral outcomes and maintain public trust. Therefore, the weaknesses of Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum (Bawaslu) must be examined through three interconnected dimensions: legal substance, legal structure, and legal culture ([Asshiddiqie, 2021](#); [Tarigan, 2025](#)).

First, from the perspective of legal substance, the primary issue lies in the complexity, fragmentation, and inconsistency of electoral regulations. Legal substance encompasses written norms, unwritten norms, judicial decisions, and laws that develop within society. In electoral practice, numerous technical regulations have contributed to an overly formalistic approach to law enforcement. This situation can be observed in the handling of money politics. Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections regulates the prohibition of money politics, including provisions under Article 278 paragraph (2), Article 280 paragraph (1) letter j, Article 284, Article 286, Article 515, and Article 523. However, the enforcement of these provisions is frequently constrained by formal and substantive requirements established through implementing regulations.

Money politics represents a concrete example of how legal norms that appear clear at the statutory level can become difficult to enforce in practice. When Peraturan Bawaslu requires the fulfillment of requirements concerning findings and reports, preliminary assessments, formal and material completeness, handling procedures, and discussions within the Sentra Penegakan Hukum Terpadu (Gakkumdu), alleged violations may be terminated before reaching the investigation or judicial process. Consequently, electoral law enforcement often appears more focused on verifying procedural compliance than evaluating the substantive aspects of violations themselves.

Data on the handling of electoral violations in the 2024 election indicates a decline in the number of election crime cases processed compared with the 2019 election. In 2019, there were 849 cases, consisting of 367 cases forwarded to the police, 482 cases discontinued, and 314 cases escalated to the second stage of proceedings. In 2024, there were 332 cases, consisting of 149 cases undergoing review processes, 108 cases discontinued, and 65 cases handled further; among these 65 cases, 16 proceeded to investigation, 12 were terminated, and 37 advanced to the second stage. The decline in the number of cases cannot necessarily be interpreted as a reduction in electoral violations, as it may also reflect difficulties in proving violations and the increasingly strict procedural requirements for enforcement ([Ardianto, 2024](#)).

Second, from the perspective of legal structure, the problem relates to institutional relations, authority, and the effectiveness of implementing Bawaslu's decisions or recommendations. Legal structure refers to the institutions and legal apparatus responsible for implementing and enforcing the law. In the context of Bawaslu, structural weaknesses can be identified through its limited

executive authority over the implementation of its decisions or recommendations. In several cases, Bawaslu's recommendations must undergo further review by the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), resulting in situations where recommendations are not implemented or become subject to further debate. This condition weakens the institutional position of Bawaslu as an institution that should possess stronger authority in resolving electoral violations and disputes (Friedman, 2013; Fundamental & Razak, 2023).

Table 1. Bawaslu Decision/Recommendation Follow-Up Data, 2024 Election

Category of Decision/Recommendation	Number of Cases (2024)	Followed Up by KPU (%)	Not Followed Up (%)
Administrative violation recommendations	183	71%	29%
Election process dispute decisions	67	84%	16%
Election crime referrals to Gakkumdu	65	55% (investigated)	45% (discontinued)

Source: Adapted from Bawaslu Annual Report 2024 (Ardianto, 2024); Sholihin & Wibawa (2023)

Structural weaknesses are also apparent in the *Gakkumdu* mechanism. *Gakkumdu* is designed as a coordination forum among Bawaslu, the police, and the prosecutor's office for handling election crimes. However, in practice, differences in institutional perspectives often make case handling slow and ineffective. For violations requiring rapid responses, such as online smear campaigns or prohibited campaign content on social media, lengthy coordination procedures can cause enforcement actions to lose relevance within the short election period. The 2024 election campaign schedule, for example, was determined within a limited timeframe under KPU Regulation Number 3 of 2022 (KPU Regulation No. 3 of 2022, 2022). This condition requires Bawaslu to have greater independent authority to respond to violations promptly and effectively (KPU Regulation No. 3 of 2022, 2022).

Procedural weaknesses in *Gakkumdu* can also be observed in Bawaslu's limitations in fulfilling formal and material evidentiary requirements, particularly regarding witnesses and supporting evidence. Bawaslu does not have the authority to compel witnesses during the initial stage of handling violations, even though, during the investigation stage, the police require data and information that may have been previously collected by Bawaslu. In cases of money politics, the evidentiary process becomes increasingly challenging because the elements of a campaign violation are often interpreted cumulatively. Perpetrators may avoid legal sanctions by providing money or goods without explicitly conveying their vision, mission, programs, or an invitation to vote (Lubis, 2026; Nainggolan & Marzuki, 2021).

Third, from the perspective of legal culture, problems arise in the attitudes, courage, and legal awareness of election organizers and the community. A permissive legal culture toward money politics causes violations to be frequently perceived as merely providing transportation allowances, meal expenses, compensation for participation, or forms of social assistance. In campaign practices, such gifts are often framed as compensation for participants' time and expenses, making it difficult to categorize them as money politics. Substantively, however, these practices may undermine voters' freedom of choice and reduce the quality of democracy (Densi & Delarue, 2026; Nail, 2019).

The development of political money practices further complicates law enforcement efforts. Money politics does not only occur through pre-election cash distribution, commonly known as *serangan fajar*, but also through mass mobilization and the use of digital wallets. Technological developments have made political financial transactions more difficult to trace because they are not always conducted directly or transparently. In this context, election law enforcement requires the courage to interpret legal norms substantively rather than merely focusing on conventional forms of violations (Yosieva & Fitriano, 2024).

Legal culture is also closely related to the neutrality of election organizers. Data on violations of the election organizers' code of ethics indicate an increase in cases during the 2024 election compared with the 2019 election. In the 2019 election, there were 162 cases of violations of the organizers' code of ethics, whereas in the 2024 election, the number increased to 266 cases. This increase demonstrates that strengthening the Bawaslu institution cannot be achieved solely through

expanding authority; it must also be accompanied by improvements in the ethical culture, integrity, and neutrality of election organizers (Abra, 2024).

The Future Idea of Bawaslu as an Election Conflict Resolution Institution

The future direction of *Bawaslu* must depart from the principle that elections constitute an exercise of the people's sovereignty. Article 1 and Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia affirm the constitutional foundation for the implementation of democratic elections. Therefore, the resolution of electoral conflicts should not be limited to procedural measures but should be directed toward safeguarding the principles of direct, general, free, confidential, honest, and fair elections (Syafriadi & Santri, 2023).

From the aspect of legal substance, the first idea is to strengthen the application of substantive justice in election law enforcement. The handling of election violations should not be terminated merely because certain administrative requirements are not fulfilled if there are substantial indications of serious violations. In election criminal cases, the final assessment of an alleged violation should be given sufficient space until the judicial process rather than being prematurely terminated at the plenary stage or during the initial review process. If proceedings are discontinued solely due to formal considerations, election law risks losing its corrective function in addressing violations of democratic principles.

The second idea is the harmonization of election regulations both vertically and horizontally. Harmonization is required among laws, *KPU Regulations*, *Bawaslu Regulations*, and judicial decisions. Regulatory inconsistencies have the potential to generate different interpretations, for example, regarding the eligibility of former prisoners as candidates, women's representation requirements, or the evidentiary standards for proving money politics. Harmonization is also essential to ensure that technical regulations do not conflict with higher legal norms and do not restrict the constitutional mandate of fair elections.

The third idea is the unification and simplification of election regulations. The consolidation of election regulations into Law Number 7 of 2017 represents an important step because it facilitates understanding of election law among election organizers, participants, and the public. However, this unification needs to be followed by an evaluation of provisions that remain overlapping, subject to multiple interpretations, or excessively technical. Simple, clear, and consistent election regulations will strengthen legal certainty while facilitating enforcement by *Bawaslu* (Helen, 2020; Taqiuddin, 2025).

From the aspect of legal structure, an important idea that requires consideration is the reconstruction of the role of *Gakkumdu*. The various criticisms regarding the effectiveness of *Gakkumdu* indicate the need for a fundamental evaluation of the institutional design for handling election crimes. *Gakkumdu* can be reconstructed to operate more efficiently with uniform standards of evidence, or the initial authority to handle election crimes can be more firmly assigned to *Bawaslu* as the primary institution responsible for identifying and assessing alleged violations. With clearer authority, *Bawaslu* can determine whether an alleged violation is feasible to proceed without being overly dependent on differences in institutional perspectives during the early stages of handling.

Strengthening *Bawaslu* as a one-stop institution does not mean eliminating the roles of the police and the prosecutor's office within the criminal justice system, but rather restructuring the initial mechanism of case handling to achieve greater effectiveness. As an election supervisory institution, *Bawaslu* possesses closer access to election stages, data, reports, and field dynamics. Therefore, *Bawaslu* requires more adequate authority to assess alleged violations before cases enter the investigation and prosecution stages. This argument aligns with the view that *Bawaslu* has the authority to receive and follow up on reports concerning administrative violations, election crimes, ethical violations, and other violations of election law (Lubis, 2026; Nugraha, 2020).

The next structural idea is strengthening the enforcement of *Bawaslu's* decisions and recommendations. Decisions or recommendations that do not have strong legal consequences may reduce institutional authority and weaken public trust. Therefore, a mechanism is needed to ensure that *Bawaslu's* recommendations are followed up clearly, measurably, and within a specified timeframe. If objections are submitted, the correction mechanism must be strictly regulated so that *Bawaslu's* decisions are not continuously subject to negotiation by other institutions.

From the aspect of legal culture, the first idea is to establish a shared understanding among election organizers regarding money politics. This understanding must be directed toward its substantive meaning, namely any form of giving or benefit intended to influence voters' choices, whether conducted directly or indirectly. Without a consistent understanding, money politics violations will continue to evolve and become increasingly difficult for law enforcement institutions to address. Ethical education and technical training for election organizers should be directed toward building the courage to take firm action against practices that substantially undermine democracy.

The second idea is strengthening the selection and development of human resources for election organizers. The neutrality of organizers should not only be demonstrated through formal declarations but must also be reinforced through mechanisms for reviewing personal backgrounds, internal supervision, public oversight, and strict ethical sanctions. Issues such as family relationships, organizational affiliations, secondary employment, or political connections may influence the willingness of organizers to take action against violations. Therefore, the selection and development system must be capable of minimizing potential conflicts of interest from the outset.

The third idea is strengthening ethical sanctions as part of developing the legal culture of election organizers. Ethical sanctions should not be viewed merely as administrative instruments but as mechanisms for maintaining the integrity of election administration institutions. If ethical sanctions are applied consistently and transparently, election organizers will develop stronger behavioral standards when facing political pressure. Strengthening this ethical culture is a prerequisite for *Bawaslu* to become a more professional, independent, transparent institution oriented toward substantive justice in the future.

Thus, the future of *Bawaslu* as an electoral conflict resolution institution depends on the state's ability to improve the three components of the legal system simultaneously. The substance of election law must become clearer and less formalistic; the legal structure must provide *Bawaslu* with effective and measurable authority; meanwhile, the legal culture must be developed through the integrity, courage, and ethical awareness of election organizers. Without comprehensive reform, *Bawaslu* will continue to face recurring challenges in every election cycle.

Discussion

The findings of this study confirm the relevance of Lawrence M. Friedman's (2013) legal system theory framework in examining the performance of *Bawaslu* as an election conflict resolution institution (Fundamental & Razak, 2023). The three components of the legal system, namely legal substance, legal structure, and legal culture, have been demonstrated to interact with one another and may mutually weaken the overall system when one component does not function optimally. The decline in the number of election criminal cases processed during the 2024 election compared with the 2019 election does not necessarily indicate a reduction in violations; rather, it reflects systemic weaknesses across these three interconnected components (Friedman, 2013; Fundamental & Razak, 2023).

From the perspective of legal substance, the findings of this study are consistent with Sholihin and Wibawa (2023), who concluded that procedural formalism is a fundamental cause of weak election law enforcement in Indonesia. The provisions prohibiting money politics under Law Number 7 of 2017 are substantively comprehensive; however, the implementing regulations that require the strict fulfillment of cumulative elements have created legal loopholes that allow perpetrators to avoid prosecution. This condition differs from practices in several more established democracies, where the evidentiary requirements for election violations are applied through alternative elements rather than cumulative requirements, thereby broadening the scope for enforcement. The inconsistency between statutory norms and their implementing technical regulations reinforces Helen's (2020) argument that vertical and horizontal harmonization of election regulations is an urgent necessity (Taqiuddin, 2025).

From the perspective of legal structure, the findings of this study strengthen the criticisms raised by Junaidi (2020) and Aermadepa (2019) regarding the effectiveness of Gakkumdu. However, this study advances the discussion by emphasizing that the weakness of Gakkumdu is not merely a technical coordination problem among institutions but a more fundamental issue of institutional design (Awaluddin, 2026; Saktiko & Delmiati, 2026). When *Bawaslu* lacks coercive authority to compel witness attendance during the initial stages of case handling, while law enforcement agencies require preliminary evidence collected by *Bawaslu* to initiate investigations, recurring institutional

deadlocks emerge throughout each election cycle. This finding supports Nugraha's (2020) view that strengthening Bawaslu's enforcement authority is not merely an alternative policy choice but a prerequisite for enabling this institution to function effectively as a central pillar of electoral conflict resolution (Lubis, 2026).

This study further reveals that the structural weaknesses of Bawaslu generate multilayered impacts that have not been fully explored in previous studies. Nainggolan and Marzuki (2021) primarily focus on dispute resolution processes at the district level, whereas Nasution et al. (2023) examine black campaign practices on social media (Lubis, 2026). This research demonstrates that both issues originate from a similar fundamental problem: the absence of independent and binding authority for Bawaslu. As long as Bawaslu's recommendations remain subject to reconsideration by other institutions without a clear corrective mechanism, the entire chain of electoral law enforcement remains vulnerable to institutional bottlenecks in handling administrative violations, election crimes, and ethical violations.

From the perspective of legal culture, the findings of this study emphasize that the most fundamental challenge lies within the component that is the most difficult to transform through regulatory reform alone. The increase in violations of election organizers' codes of ethics from 162 cases in the 2019 election to 266 cases in the 2024 election represents a critical signal that requires serious attention. Syamsarina et al. (2022) argue that low legal awareness among election organizers is not solely caused by inadequate understanding of regulations but also by the weak internalization of integrity values within institutional culture. These findings strengthen the argument that ethics education and the reinforcement of merit-based selection mechanisms represent long-term investments that cannot be replaced merely through the expansion of normative authority.

The findings regarding the transformation of money politics from conventional methods into digital transaction-based practices require particular attention. Yosieva and Fitriyono (2024) identified challenges in Gakkumdu's handling of money politics cases; however, their study did not specifically examine the implications of digital wallets and electronic transactions for evidentiary standards. This study confirms that the current regulatory framework has not fully anticipated this transformation in violation mechanisms. Nail (2019) emphasizes that law enforcement systems relying exclusively on conventional interpretations of violations will continuously lag behind the innovations employed by perpetrators (Densi & Delarue, 2026). Therefore, a purposive interpretation of legal norms that focuses on the substance and objectives of prohibited conduct, rather than merely its formal manifestations, is necessary.

The concept of Bawaslu as a one-stop institution for electoral conflict resolution proposed in this study has a strong comparative foundation. In countries with more effective election supervision systems, the authority to address initial violations, including both administrative and criminal matters, is generally concentrated within a single institution that possesses direct access to relevant data and field-level dynamics. This model does not eliminate the roles of the police and prosecution authorities; rather, it positions Bawaslu as the initial gateway responsible for determining whether alleged violations warrant further investigation. Syafriadi and Santri (2023) conclude that strengthening the role of Bawaslu represents an urgent structural requirement, and this study provides a more concrete conceptual framework for achieving such institutional strengthening.

This research has several limitations that should be acknowledged. As a normative legal study, the analysis relies primarily on secondary sources, including legislation, judicial decisions, and academic literature; therefore, it does not capture the empirical perspectives of direct stakeholders, such as Bawaslu commissioners, police investigators, prosecutors, or election participants. Future empirical studies employing in-depth interviews or stakeholder surveys would provide valuable complementary evidence and contribute to validating the normative findings of this research. Furthermore, systematic comparative studies examining election supervision models in ASEAN countries or other emerging democracies may strengthen the foundation for the policy recommendations proposed in this study.

CONCLUSION

Bawaslu as an election conflict resolution institution in Indonesia has weaknesses that can be examined through the three components of the legal system. From the aspect of legal substance, election regulations still face problems of inconsistency, multiple interpretations, and procedural

formalism, particularly in addressing money politics and election crimes. From the aspect of legal structure, the weaknesses are reflected in the limited enforcement power of Bawaslu's recommendations or decisions and the ineffectiveness of the Gakkumdu mechanism in supporting the rapid and definitive handling of violations. From the aspect of legal culture, challenges remain regarding neutrality, institutional courage, and a shared understanding among election organizers and law enforcement actors in addressing election violations, particularly money politics, which continues to evolve into various forms.

The future direction of Bawaslu needs to focus on strengthening substantive justice in the enforcement of election laws. This can be achieved through the harmonization of election regulations, simplification of legal norms, strengthening Bawaslu's authority as an integrated institution for resolving electoral conflicts, reconstruction of the role of Gakkumdu, enhancement of the enforcement power of decisions and recommendations, and reinforcement of ethical sanctions for election organizers. Through these improvements, Bawaslu is expected to become a more professional, independent, transparent, and effective institution in safeguarding the principles of direct, public, free, confidential, honest, and fair elections.

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