



## Human Rights and Constitutional Supremacy in Indonesia: Normative Guarantees and Policy Disharmony in Natural Resource Management, Freedom of Expression, and Public Participation

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**Abstract**

**Background:** The research is grounded in the post-amendment strengthening of human rights guarantees following the amendments to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1999–2002), which marked a paradigmatic shift from governmental supremacy toward constitutional supremacy.

**Objective:** This study aims to analyze the constitutional status of human rights within the framework of Indonesian constitutional law and to examine the disharmony between constitutional supremacy and the practice of public policymaking.

**Methods:** The research employs a normative juridical method, utilizing statutory, conceptual, and analytical approaches to constitutional provisions, legal doctrines, and Constitutional Court decisions.

**Results:** The findings reveal three principal forms of constitutional disharmony in Indonesian public policy: (1) ecological rights violations in natural resource concession policies, evidenced by the Tumpang Pitu mining conflict and South Kalimantan coal flooding cases; (2) disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression through the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law, illustrated by the Baiq Nuril and Jerinx SID cases; and (3) procedural legitimacy deficits in legislation, exemplified by the enactment of the Job Creation Law with minimal public consultation. The analysis demonstrates that administrative legality consistently diverges from constitutional legitimacy across these three policy domains, underscoring the inadequacy of formal legal compliance as a substitute for substantive constitutional protection.

**Conclusion:** The study concludes that the effective protection of human rights is contingent upon the integration of constitutional supremacy in its normative, institutional, and ethical dimensions, thereby ensuring that the Constitution operates as an instrument of substantive justice within a democratic rule-of-law state.

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### INTRODUCTION

Human rights constitute both the moral and juridical foundations for the establishment of a modern state (Triadi, 2025). In the paradigm of constitutionalism, the state is not merely formed to exercise power but to guarantee and protect human dignity as the highest source of legitimacy for that power itself (Robbani, 2025; Zaini, 2020). A state that fails to protect the basic rights of

its citizens has, in essence, lost its existential basis as a legitimate organization of power. Therefore, the discussion of human rights from a constitutional law perspective is, in fact, a discussion of the limits, direction, and legitimacy of state power.

In the context of the Indonesian state, the commitment to human rights received significant reinforcement through the amendments to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia during the 1999–2002 period. This constitutional change gave rise to Chapter XA concerning Human Rights (Articles 28A–28J), which, for the first time, regulates human rights guarantees systematically and comprehensively within the constitutional text. This transformation marked a paradigm shift in constitutional governance from governmental supremacy to constitutional supremacy (Risky et al., 2025), while simultaneously affirming Indonesia as a rule-of-law state founded on respect for the fundamental rights of its citizens.

Normatively, this constitutional recognition strengthens the position of human rights as an integral part of the constitutional structure. The state is no longer viewed as an entity standing above citizens but rather as an institution limited and directed by constitutional norms (Jimly, 2021; Muhamad, 2026). In this framework, human rights possess not only moral and philosophical dimensions but also a juridical dimension that binds all branches of state power (devi, 2025; Gunawan, 2018). The existence of institutions such as the Constitutional Court, with its authority to review laws against the constitution, further affirms that the protection of citizens' constitutional rights lies at the core of Indonesia's constitutional law system.

Nevertheless, this normative progress has not yet fully aligned with practical reality. In various development policies, particularly those related to natural resource management and large-scale investment, tensions often arise between the agenda of economic growth and the protection of community social rights (Qasthary et al., 2025). Several cases indicate that policies which are formally legal under the law may potentially disregard the right to a good environment, the right to participation, and the right to social welfare as guaranteed by the constitution. This phenomenon creates a paradox within the rule-of-law state: administrative legality is not always identical to substantive justice. Empirical evidence makes this disharmony concrete: the Tumpang Pitu gold mining project in Banyuwangi (2015–2018) triggered agrarian conflicts involving communities invoking their right to a good environment under Article 28H(1); coal mining activities in South Kalimantan contributed to flooding in 2021, with licensing practices criticized as privileging investment over ecological rights; Job Susetiyo (2022) was enacted through an omnibus method with minimal public consultation, prompting the Constitutional Court to declare it “conditionally unconstitutional” in Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020; and the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (UU ITE) has been applied in cases such as Akhmad (2022) and Feka (2025), drawing criticism as disproportionate restrictions on constitutionally protected freedom of expression under Article 28E(3). Collectively, these cases reveal a structural paradox at the heart of Indonesia's rule-of-law state.

This condition reveals a gap between constitutional ideals and public policy implementation. Law, which should function as an instrument to limit power and protect human rights, is often reduced to formal legitimacy for political and economic interests. In such a situation, a study is needed that is not merely normative-dogmatic but also reflective and critical in examining how human rights principles are integrated into Indonesia's legal system and constitutional practices. Several prior studies have examined related aspects of this problem. Safitria et al. (2024) analyzed the implementation of constitutional norms in human rights protection, finding that normative guarantees exist but institutional enforcement mechanisms remain weak. Risky et al. (2025) examined socio-legal dimensions of executive supremacy in ministerial reform, concluding that post-amendment constitutional architecture still faces challenges from political pragmatism. Amin (2025) studied the Constitutional Court's role in upholding constitutionalism through judicial review decisions from 2019–2024, demonstrating both achievements and limitations in the court's protective capacity. However, these studies have not systematically analyzed the interaction among three concurrent dimensions of policy disharmony (natural resource management, freedom of expression, and public participation) within a unified tri-dimensional constitutional framework (normative, institutional, ethical). This research addresses that gap, offering an integrated analytical model for diagnosing and responding to constitutional disharmony in Indonesian public policy. The novelty of this research

lies in its application of a tri-dimensional constitutional supremacy framework to three empirically grounded policy domains, generating a structured diagnostic model that extends beyond existing normative or single-domain analyses.

Based on this background, this research is important for analyzing the position of human rights from the perspective of Indonesian constitutional law, including philosophical, normative, and institutional dimensions, as well as examining the challenges of their implementation in public policy. Thus, this study is expected to contribute theoretically to the development of Indonesian constitutional discourse while offering critical reflection on the practice of power execution within a democratic and socially just rule-of-law state.

## METHOD

This research employed a normative legal research method, focusing on the analysis of positive legal norms, legal principles, and legal doctrines related to human rights within Indonesia's constitutional law system (Alkhuseri et al., 2025; Suntoro, 2020). This method was chosen because the research aimed to conceptually and normatively examine the relationship between constitutional supremacy and public policy implementation that impacts the protection of human rights.

Within this framework, law was understood as a system of norms possessing a prescriptive dimension; therefore, the research not only described applicable provisions but also evaluated the consistency and harmonization between constitutional norms and state policy practices. The main focus of the research was directed toward the position of human rights in Indonesia's post-amendment constitutional system, as well as the constitutional mechanisms that functioned to limit state power.

### Legal Materials

This study employed three categories of legal materials: (1) Primary legal materials, comprising the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (pre- and post-amendment), Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power, Law No. 8 of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, the Job Creation Law (Law No. 11 of 2020 as amended), the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (Law No. 19 of 2016), and selected Constitutional Court decisions, including Decision No. 35/PUU-X/2012 and Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020; (2) Secondary legal materials, comprising academic books, peer-reviewed journal articles, and legal commentaries on constitutional law, human rights, and public policy; and (3) Tertiary legal materials, comprising legal dictionaries, legal encyclopedias, and official government reports used for definitional and contextual clarification.

### Legal Material Collection Technique

Legal materials were collected through library research, encompassing systematic documentary review of constitutional texts, legislation, judicial decisions, and academic literature. Constitutional Court decisions were accessed through the Court's official database (mkri.id). Academic literature was sourced from databases including Google Scholar, SINTA, and institutional repositories, with preference given to publications from 2018–2026 to ensure currency and relevance.

### Analysis Technique

Data were analyzed using three complementary techniques: (1) normative analysis, examining whether public policy instruments conform to the hierarchy of constitutional norms; (2) reflective analysis, evaluating the substantive quality of human rights protection beyond formal legality, drawing on proportionality and constitutional morality principles; and (3) comparative analysis, tracing paradigmatic shifts before and after the 1999–2002 constitutional amendments to identify structural changes in rights protection. Each policy case examined in the Results and Discussion section was analyzed through three parameters: (a) the constitutional norm invoked, (b) the form of policy disharmony identified, and (c) the impact on citizens' rights, ensuring analytical consistency across all case examples.

### Case and Policy Selection Criteria

Policy cases and court decisions were selected based on four criteria: (1) direct relevance to constitutional rights under Chapters XA or X of the 1945 Constitution; (2) documented evidence of tension between administrative legality and constitutional legitimacy; (3) availability of official court decisions, government reports, or peer-reviewed documentation; and (4) representativeness across the three identified policy domains (natural resource management, freedom of expression, legislative participation). Cases meeting these criteria included the Tumpang Pitu mining conflict, South Kalimantan flooding, ITE Law criminal cases (Baiq Nuril, Jerinx SID), and Constitutional Court decisions on the Job Creation Law and customary forest rights.

### Research Limitations

This research was normative in nature and did not include empirical survey data or field interviews. The analysis was limited to the three identified policy domains and to cases documented in publicly accessible official sources. The findings were specific to the Indonesian constitutional context and may not be directly generalizable to other jurisdictions.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The conception of human rights within constitutional law fundamentally revolves around the perennial question of governance: how can state power be limited so as not to suppress individual freedoms while simultaneously ensuring that these freedoms are exercised within the framework of legal order (Liyawanti & Gunawan, 2026). From natural law to modern constitutionalism, human rights have consistently been positioned as normative instruments designed to curb the potential excesses of political power. In a rule-of-law state, the principle of constitutional supremacy functions as a crucial intermediary between moral ideals and political realities, ensuring that no authority can operate beyond the constraints of law and that governance remains accountable to the fundamental norms of the constitution (Alwan, 2025). This dual role of human rights, both protective and regulatory, highlights their significance not merely as ethical imperatives but also as legally enforceable standards within constitutional frameworks.

Theoretical discourses on human rights have evolved through three major currents of thought, each offering complementary insights while addressing the limitations inherent in the others: natural law, legal positivism, and the critical approach.

**Table 1.** Three Schools of Thought in the Causality of Constitutional Law Reflection

No.	School of Thought	Main Idea	Implication in Constitutional Law
1.	Natural Law	Rights are inherent from birth, predating the state	The constitution merely recognizes and guarantees rights
2.	Legal Positivism	Rights are valid only when institutionalized in law	Human rights protection requires written norms
3.	Critical Approach	Law is not neutral; it is influenced by power	Human rights implementation must be structurally supervised

The natural law tradition emphasizes that human rights are inherent and inalienable, existing prior to the establishment of any state. Legal positivism, in contrast, underscores the necessity of formal institutionalization of rights through codified legal norms. The critical approach, meanwhile, interrogates the interplay between law and socio-political power, emphasizing the need for structural oversight to prevent rights from being subordinated to political or economic interests (Table 1). Together, these perspectives provide a multidimensional understanding of human rights as both normative ideals and practical instruments of governance.

In the natural law tradition, seminal thinkers such as John Locke asserted that individuals possess fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property that exist independently of the state (Rusmanda et al., 2025). According to this view, the role of the state is not to grant these rights but to recognize and protect them. This conception has profoundly influenced modern

constitutionalism, framing human rights as pre-legal entitlements that morally constrain governmental authority. Constitutions thus serve not as creators of rights, but as instruments that formalize, recognize, and safeguard pre-existing moral claims, ensuring that state actions remain consistent with principles of justice, dignity, and personal autonomy. By establishing legal recognition of pre-existing rights, natural law theory has provided a foundational justification for the incorporation of human rights clauses into constitutional documents worldwide.

Conversely, legal positivism asserts that rights gain binding authority only when institutionalized through formal written norms (Wuntu & Febiolandia, 2025). Without codification, human rights remain abstract moral claims with limited enforceability. Legal positivism highlights the necessity of embedding rights within the statutory framework of the state to ensure their operability and to provide mechanisms for judicial enforcement. This codification fosters legal certainty, offering individuals concrete guarantees and recourse when rights are violated. By anchoring rights in formal legal systems, the positivist approach strengthens the predictability and uniformity of legal protections, ensuring that citizens are not solely dependent on the goodwill or discretion of governmental authorities (Hasibuan, 2024).

While natural law and legal positivism provide normative and institutional grounding for human rights, the critical approach introduces a necessary lens of socio-political realism. It reminds us that law is never neutral; rather, it reflects prevailing power dynamics, economic interests, and political agendas. Human rights norms, when applied in public policy, often confront competing priorities such as development objectives, investment imperatives, or national security concerns (Sebayang, 2024). The critical perspective therefore insists that constitutional supremacy must be interpreted substantively, not merely procedurally, and that formal legality alone cannot guarantee the actual protection of rights. Legal texts and constitutional provisions, while necessary, are insufficient if their implementation is not scrutinized for fairness, proportionality, and alignment with fundamental ethical principles.

Integrating these three perspectives, a comprehensive understanding of human rights emerges: rights are inherent moral claims that require formal codification to ensure enforceability, yet their practical realization depends on vigilant oversight and alignment with constitutional principles. This multi-layered approach underscores the interdependence of normative ideals, legal structures, and institutional mechanisms in safeguarding human dignity. In the Indonesian context, the post-amendment strengthening of the 1945 Constitution exemplifies this integration, embedding explicit human rights guarantees in Chapter XA (Articles 28A–28J) while establishing judicial review mechanisms and institutional oversight to reconcile legal norms with social realities. Such a framework illustrates that constitutional supremacy is not merely a procedural doctrine but a substantive commitment to ensuring that governance respects and protects fundamental human rights across all branches of power.

Ultimately, the conception of human rights in constitutional law reflects a dynamic interplay between moral philosophy, legal formalism, and political pragmatism. It embodies the principle that no state authority may operate unchecked, that freedoms must be protected without undermining social order, and that constitutional mechanisms must continually adapt to ensure the translation of normative ideals into tangible legal and societal outcomes. This holistic understanding enables constitutional law to serve not only as a blueprint for the distribution of power but also as a safeguard for human dignity, justice, and the rule of law in contemporary democratic states.

This transformation is clearly evident in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The inclusion of Chapter XA (Articles 28A–28J) marks a shift from governmental supremacy to constitutional supremacy. For the first time, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights are systematically regulated within the Constitution. This change can be mapped in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Comparison of Constitutional Paradigms Before and After the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia

No.	Aspect	Pre-Amendment	Post-Amendment	Constitutional Implication
1.	Position of Human Rights	Limited, scattered, and implicit citizen rights	Human rights explicitly regulated in Chapter XA (Articles 28A–28J)	Strengthened normative guarantees and expanded protection scope
2.	Orientation of Power	State as center of legitimacy and source of rights	Constitution as source of legitimacy and limiter of power	Shift from state-centered to constitution-centered
3.	Power Structure	Executive dominance; MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) as supreme institution	Clearer separation of powers; checks and balances	More balanced distribution of power
4.	Constitutional Control	No constitutional judicial review	Judicial review by the Constitutional Court	Review of laws against the constitution
5.	Public Participation	Limited and elitist	Expanded through constitutional democracy principles	More open and accountable legislation
6.	Rule of Law Principle	Rule by law (formal legality)	Rule of law (constitutional supremacy and human rights)	Emphasis on substantive justice
7.	Position of the MPR	Supreme state institution	Equal state institution	No institutional supremacy

Constitutional supremacy was further strengthened through the Constitutional Court's authority of judicial review. The Court not only examines formal legality but also assesses the substantive compatibility of legislation with constitutional values (Amin, 2025). In Decision Number 35/PUU-X/2012 concerning customary forests, the Court affirmed that state control over natural resources does not constitute absolute ownership but rather a mandate to be exercised for the people's welfare. This decision reflects substantive constitutional supremacy.

Nevertheless, constitutional supremacy does not automatically eliminate disharmony in public policy. In practice, several development policies exhibit tensions between constitutional norms and administrative implementation, as exemplified in Table 3.

**Table 3.** Normative Analysis, Practices, and Concrete Case Examples

No.	Constitutional Norm	Policy Practice	Case Example (Year)	Potential Violation
1.	Right to a good environment (Article 28H paragraph 1)	Mining permits & natural resource exploitation	Gold mining conflict in Tumpang Pitu, Banyuwangi and Floods due to coal mining in South Kalimantan	Ecological damage, loss of living space, agrarian conflict
2.	Freedom of expression (Article 28E paragraph 3)	Criminalization of digital expression through the ITE Law	Cases of Baiq Nuril and Jerinx SID	Disproportionate restriction of expression and broad, multi-interpretable criminal provisions
3.	Public participation in	Legislation with minimal public	Enactment of the Job Creation Law (2020)	Legitimacy deficit & procedural

No.	Constitutional Norm	Policy Practice	Case Example (Year)	Potential Violation
	law formation (Constitutional democracy principle)	consultation		unconstitutionality

These cases demonstrate that administrative legality is not always identical to constitutional legitimacy. This highlights the relevance of the proportionality principle: every restriction of rights must have a clear legal basis, a legitimate aim, and a balance between means and ends. Applying the tri-parameter analytical framework developed in this study, each case in Table 3 reveals a distinct constitutional failure: (1) the Tumpang Pitu and South Kalimantan cases involve violations of Article 28H(1) (right to a good environment), with policy disharmony manifested in licensing without adequate environmental impact assessments, causing displacement and ecological damage to communities; (2) the ITE Law criminal cases involve restrictions on Article 28E(3) (freedom of expression), with disharmony manifested in multi-interpretable criminal provisions applied disproportionately to protected speech; and (3) the Job Creation Law case involves the constitutional democracy principle of public participation, with disharmony manifested in omnibus-method enactment that bypassed substantive deliberation, generating a legitimacy deficit later rectified through Constitutional Court intervention. This framework reveals that constitutional disharmony is structurally reproduced through three reinforcing mechanisms: regulatory overreach, enforcement arbitrariness, and participatory exclusion. Within the framework of Indonesian constitutional law, human rights protection rests on several fundamental principles (Safitria et al., 2024).

- 1) Principle of Universality: The principle of universality affirms that human rights are inherent to every human being from birth, regardless of citizenship, social status, religion, gender, or other background factors. Rights are not granted by the state but are recognized by the state.
- 2) Principle of Non-Discrimination: The non-discrimination principle is a direct derivative of universality. If rights are inherent to every human being, then every person must be treated equally before the law. The Indonesian Constitution affirms that everyone has the right to recognition, guarantees, protection, and fair legal certainty. This equality is not merely formal but also substantive.
- 3) Principle of Social Justice: Social justice is a distinctive characteristic of the Indonesian Constitution that differentiates it from pure classical liberalism. This principle not only affirms individual freedom but also emphasizes the state's responsibility to protect structurally vulnerable groups. It demands a more active role from the state; the state cannot remain neutral and must take affirmative steps to reduce inequality.
- 4) Principle of Proportionality: No right is absolute in a modern constitutional system (except for certain rights, such as the right not to be tortured). Therefore, restrictions on rights are possible but must satisfy the proportionality principle. Without proportionality, restrictions on rights can easily transform into legitimized suppression. In a democratic rule-of-law state, restrictions must be rational, measurable, and subject to judicial review.
- 5) Principle of Constitutional Supremacy: Constitutional supremacy is the principle that ensures the entire legal system is subject to the state's fundamental norms. In the hierarchy of norms theory, the constitution occupies the highest position. Without constitutional supremacy, human rights are vulnerable to political change. With constitutional supremacy, rights gain stability and long-term protection.

These principles do not stand alone but form an ethical unity within the constitutional system. Rights and obligations are positioned in a balanced manner, as affirmed in Article 28J of the 1945 Constitution. Indonesia's human rights paradigm is not purely liberal-individualistic but is rooted in Pancasila values that emphasize social justice.

Nevertheless, the greatest challenge lies in the gap between norms and implementation. Many policies that are textually legitimate substantively erode the social rights of communities. This indicates that the main problem is no longer a lack of norms but inconsistency in enforcement. Therefore, constitutional supremacy must be understood in three layers.

- 1) **Normative Supremacy:** This is the foundational principle of a constitutional state, namely that the constitution occupies the highest position in the hierarchy of laws and regulations. Within this framework, all legal products whether laws, government regulations, or administrative policies must be subject to and aligned with constitutional norms. Normative supremacy concerns not only the formal aspect of legal hierarchy but also reflects the commitment that the fundamental values contained in the constitution, including human rights, serve as the primary parameters in the formulation and implementation of public policy.
- 2) **Institutional Supremacy:** Judicial independence is an absolute requirement for institutional supremacy. Without freedom from political intervention, the judiciary cannot exercise its supervisory function objectively. An independent judiciary ensures that every citizen has access to constitutional justice, especially when their rights are violated by state policies. Thus, institutional supremacy represents a concrete manifestation of the checks-and-balances principle in a constitutional democracy.
- 3) **Ethical Supremacy:** Above normative and institutional supremacy lies a deeper dimension: ethical supremacy. Ethical supremacy refers to the internalization of constitutional values within the moral consciousness of state administrators. The constitution is followed not merely because of legal obligation but as a moral commitment to justice, human dignity, and the common good. Ethical supremacy demands what is often called constitutional morality, namely the willingness of political actors and public officials to act in accordance with the spirit of the constitution, even when no direct legal sanctions are present. Constitutional morality prevents legal manipulation, exploitation of normative loopholes, or the exercise of authority that is formally legal but substantively detrimental to citizens' rights.

Without this third layer, constitutional supremacy risks becoming a mere formal symbol. The constitution can be cited in discourse but ignored in practice. Ultimately, human rights from the perspective of Indonesian constitutional law represent an ongoing dialectical process. Constitutional supremacy must function as a normative compass guiding public policy toward human dignity (Simanjuntak & Silalahi, 2025). When norms and policies align, the rule-of-law state moves toward substantive justice. However, when disharmony persists, the constitution loses its transformative power.

Thus, the intersection of constitutional supremacy and public policy becomes a testing ground for the quality of Indonesia's constitutional democracy. It is there that human rights find their true meaning not merely as constitutional text, but as the essence of state power in action.

## CONCLUSION

Human rights, from the perspective of Indonesian constitutional law, occupy a fundamental position as both the limit and the basis for the legitimacy of state power. The amendments to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia have affirmed a paradigm shift from the supremacy of power toward constitutional supremacy by incorporating explicit and comprehensive human rights guarantees into the constitutional structure. This transformation confirms that the constitution is no longer merely a document organizing state institutions but the basic norm that places human dignity at the center of the orientation of power. Thus, human rights attain the status of constitutional rights that bind all branches of power and serve as the main parameter in the formation and review of public policy. Nevertheless, this research demonstrates a tension between the normative ideals of the constitution and the reality of policy implementation. Various policy practices in natural resource management, restrictions on freedom of expression, and legislative processes lacking public participation reveal that administrative legality is not always identical to constitutional legitimacy. It is here that the relevance of constitutional supremacy is concretely tested. The role of the Constitutional Court through the judicial review mechanism constitutes an important instrument in maintaining consistency between norms and practice; however, its effectiveness remains dependent on institutional independence, the integrity of law enforcement actors, and political compliance with constitutional decisions.

Based on the foregoing analysis, this research advances the following practical recommendations: (1) for the legislature: enact implementing legislation that operationalizes Articles 28A–28J into enforceable obligations and ensures genuine public deliberation in rights-

sensitive legislative processes; (2) for the executive government: establish an inter-ministerial ex ante constitutional compliance review mechanism for development policies affecting environmental rights and land use, anchored in the proportionality framework; (3) for the Constitutional Court: develop clearer doctrinal standards for substantive constitutional review of policies that indirectly restrict rights, and strengthen enforcement mechanisms for its decisions, including conditionally unconstitutional rulings; and (4) for civil society and academia: build independent constitutional monitoring frameworks documenting the gap between formal legality and constitutional legitimacy in public policy, thereby supporting evidence-based advocacy and legal reform.

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#### AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Moh. Sigit Gunawan conceptualized the study, developed the research framework, and wrote the initial draft. Siska Karina conducted literature review, data compilation, and assisted in manuscript revision. Both authors discussed the findings, contributed to the interpretation, and approved the final version of the manuscript, taking full responsibility for its content.

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